A Case for Peace Through Proliferation
Seyed Yasser Jebraily
For over two decades, Iran has subscribed to the logic of nuclear restraint. As a signatory to NPT, Iran has consistently emphasized the peaceful nature of its nuclear program and submitted to extensive inspections and international oversight.
However, despite Iran’s adherence to its non-proliferation commitments, it has remained the target of repeated Israeli acts of aggression- backed by the United States. Iran’s non-nuclear status has not shielded it from the use of force; instead, it has arguably emboldened adversaries by signaling a lack of ultimate deterrent capability.
Iran’s adherence to non-proliferation has been premised on the belief that international norms and institutions would act as stabilizers. However, the assumption that rules, regimes, and legal commitments constrain state behavior has proven increasingly untenable in an international system where power dynamics often override legal obligations, and where enforcement tends to be selective and politically driven.
In an international system without a central authority to enforce norms or punish violators, security becomes a self-help enterprise—each state must depend on its own capabilities to deter threats.
Classical deterrence theory rests on a simple premise: the threat of unacceptable retaliation can prevent aggression. This logic has been successfully employed by other actors. By contrast, Iran’s strategic restraint has been met not with security assurances but with military pressure and economic sanctions.
A shift in Iran’s strategic calculus -from non-proliferation to calculated nuclear latency or even weaponization- would not be an irrational escalation but a rational response to structural insecurity. Peace through proliferation is not a celebration of armament; it is a recognition that, under certain conditions, credible deterrence is the only guarantor of sovereignty.
Such a shift would entail:
1- Developing the infrastructure and delivery systems necessary for second-strike capability.
2- Establishing a clear declaratory policy that emphasizes the defensive nature of any future nuclear posture.
3- Engaging in controlled opacity, whereby ambiguity itself serves as a stabilizing force.
Critics will warn of regional arms races and diplomatic fallout. Yet the proliferation already exists in practice, if not in law. The region is not non-nuclear; it is selectively nuclear.
Iran has consistently argued that nuclear weapons are immoral, a position deeply rooted in Islamic ethics and formally endorsed through the religious edict (fatwa) of the Supreme Leader.
However, Islamic jurisprudence does not treat all rulings as immutable in the face of changing realities. If, in the current strategic environment, the absence of a credible nuclear deterrent places millions of lives at the mercy of a belligerent and unrestrained entity like Israel, then the jurisprudential framework allows for a conditional shift. Under these exceptional conditions, the prohibition may be suspended temporarily. This would not represent a rejection of moral or religious principles, but a jurisprudentially sound response to an existential necessity.
In this light, the strategy of peace through proliferation is a rational recalibration of national defense within both the strategic and religious frameworks.
Iran’s experiment with non-proliferation has failed to produce security or respect. The international system has punished its restraint while rewarding others’ defiance. It is time to rethink the foundations of national defense strategy.
Only when Iran possesses the means to inflict unacceptable costs on its adversaries will those adversaries be compelled to negotiate seriously, de-escalate hostilities, and accept regional pluralism. In an unforgiving world governed by power, peace is not given—it is secured.
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