The Social Function of Toy Models
in Games of Science
Abstract
In the philosophy of science, models have risen from the low ranks of just mere aids to the unprecedented high ranks of model-based science. With the rise of models arise philosophical questions: what are they? How can they provide knowledge? How can they represent? Some have tried to solve these problems by seeing models as toys or props, and scientific activity as play or fiction. Some of these fictionalists are inspired by Kendall Walton’s theory of fiction. They suggest that scientific models represent reality because they function as props in scientific games of make-believe. But what does it mean to function? For Walton, it is the “social function” of props to generate fictional truths and coordinate imaginations. Despite the central role of sociality in Walton’s account, Roman Frigg and Adam Toon have almost neglected it. Here, I spell out this social function, by showing how games of make-believe have normative force. This force is provided by the playing practice of players themselves in the relevant community. I conclude by suggesting that the notion of community should be as inclusive as possible. It is constituted not only by human players but also by non-human ones.
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