۱۱۸. این بررسی اهمیتش را از کجا می گیرد، در حالی که ظاهراً کارش فقط این است که هر چیز جالب را، یعنی هر چیز بزرگ و مهم را، ویران کند؟ (گویی همۀ ساختمان ها را ویران می کند و فقط تکه سنگ و آوار باقی می گذارد.) ولی اینها که ما ویران می کنیم فقط بناهایی مقوایی اند، و ما آن زمین زبان را که رویش برپا بودند پاک می کنیم.
۱۱۹. نتایج فلسفه اینها است: کشف مهملی از مهملات صریح و ورمهایی که فهم در برخوردش به مرز زبان دچارشان شده است. آنها، ورمها، باعث می شوند که به ارزش
آن کشف پی ببریم.
۱۲۴. فلسفه نباید در کاربرد واقعی زبان به هیچ نحوی دخالت کند، یعنی در نهایت فقط می تواند آن را توصیف کند.
زیرا نمی تواند آن را مدلل هم کند.
همه چیز را همان طور که هست باقی می گذارد. (PI)
Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and to answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads philosophers into complete darkness. (BB, p. 18)
The existence of the experimental method [in psychology] makes us think we have the means of getting rid of the problems which trouble us; but problem and method pass one another by. (PPF §371)
(One of the greatest impediments for philosophy is the expectation of new, unheard of elucidations.) (BT, p. 309)
89. With these considerations we find ourselves facing the problem: In what way is logic something sublime?
For logic seemed to have a peculiar depth a a universal significance. Logic lay, it seemed, at the foundation of all the sciences. a For logical investigation explores the essence of all things. It seeks to see to the foundation of things, and shouldn’t concern itself whether things actually happen in this or that way. —– It arises neither from an interest in the facts of nature, nor from a need to grasp causal connections, but from an urge to understand the foundations, or essence, of everything empirical. Not, however, as if to this end we had to hunt out new facts; it is, rather, essential to our investigation that we do not seek to learn anything new by it. We want to understand something that is already in plain view. For this is what we seem in some sense not to understand.
Augustine says in Confessions XI. 14, “quid est ergo tempus? si nemo ex me quaerat scio; si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio”. a This could not be said about a question of natural science (“What is the specific gravity of hydrogen?”, for instance). Something that one knows when nobody asks one, but no longer knows when one is asked to explain it, is something that has to be called to mind. (And it is obviously something which, for some reason, it is difficult to call to mind.)
(Questions of different kinds occupy us. For instance, “What is the specific weight of this body”, “Will the weather stay nice today”, “Who will come through the door next”, etc. But among our questions there are those of a special kind. Here we have a different experience. These questions seem to be more fundamental than the others. And now I say: When we have this experience, we have arrived at the limits of language.) (BT, p. 304)
106. Here it is difficult to keep our heads above water, as it were, to see that we must stick to matters of everyday thought, and not to get on the wrong track where it seems that we have to describe extreme subtleties, which again we are quite unable to describe with the means at our disposal. We feel as if we had to repair a torn spider’s web with our fingers.
The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something – because it is always before one’s eyes.) (PI §129)
A man will be imprisoned in a room with a door that is unlocked and opens inwards; as long as it does not occur to him to pull rather than push it. (CV, p. 42)
>>Click here to continue<<